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Abstract
In this paper we discuss the role of the cross-sectional heterogeneity of beliefs in
the context of understanding and assessing macroeconomic vulnerability. Em-
phasis lies on the potential of changing levels of disagreement in expectations to
inuence the propensity of the economy to switch between dierent regimes, a
hypothesis that nds robust empirical support from a regime-switching model
with endogenous transition probabilities for output growth and realized stock
market volatility in the US.
Keywords: Heterogeneous beliefs, business cycles, regime-switching, forecast-
ing, endogenous transition probabilities
JEL classication: C53, D8, E325
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Non-technical summary
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether changing levels of aggregate disagree-
ment have the potential to render the economy more or less vulnerable to exogenous
shocks.
With agreement, disagreement respectively, we refer to a measure of aggregate
dispersion in agents' beliefs about the expected course of the real economy in the
near future. The underlying expectation may for example be about changes in em-
ployment conditions or economy-wide output.
Our hypothesis involves the assumption that changing levels of agreement do
not, as such, cause the economy to switch between high-, medium-, or low-growth
regimes but instead have the potential to impact the propensity of the economy to
switch regimes. We argue that higher levels of agreement increase the propensity to
switch from high-growth to medium- or low-growth regimes. For an actual downturn
to occur, we still have to await the arrival of exogenous shocks.
We propose a simple and transparent measure of disagreement that we derive
from survey data (Michigan survey) on expected real economic activity. Troughs in
disagreement, i.e. pronounced high levels of agreement, tend to appear prior to all
recession periods dated since 1960 in the US, including the most recent world-wide
recession of 2007-2009.
Based on a three-regime endogenous switching model for GDP growth in the
US, we provide robust evidence in favor of our hypothesis: The estimated transi-
tion probability of moving from normal growth to recession periods is about three
times as large when agreement is high (15% vs. 5% with high agreement, disagree-
ment respectively). Higher levels of disagreement also appear to let a sustainable
growth regime last longer, with the estimated probability of continuance in medium,
positive growth equaling 57% and 92% when there is high agreement, disagreement
respectively.
We also argue that the disagreement metric can be a meaningful indicator for the
purpose of measuring and assessing nancial stability. As of yet, focus has been on
interest rates, interest rate spreads, various measures of volatility, and so forth, which6
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may well be able to signal stress in nancial markets - stress having arisen, however,
means that the market was vulnerable already before the arrival of shocks, and
should therefore not be seen as measures of nancial market fragility, vulnerability
respectively. Disagreement measures are dierent in nature since they tend to signal
tranquility prior to a potential downturn.
In addition to the in-sample estimation and inference of regimes, we provide an
out-of-sample forecast evaluation of the various models. For GDP growth, both the
regime-switching mechanism as well as the further incorporation of disagreement
to condition the transition probabilities result in signicant gains with regard to
point and directional forecast accuracy up to a four-quarter horizon. Compared to
a benchmark model forecast, GDP forecast errors can be reduced by up to 18% over
the eight-year test period (2002Q1-2010Q3), and around 24% in the period covering
the recession and the remainder of the test sample (2007Q4-2010Q3). While, on
the other hand, allowing for regime-switching in the models for realized volatility
allows to explain a signicantly larger portion of its variation in-sample, the gain in
precision out-of-sample remains rather insignicant.
Along with the empirical analysis to substantiate that disagreement levels are a
useful vulnerability measure, the aim of the paper is to embed the underlying hy-
pothesis in the theoretical literature on heterogeneity and leverage, the social value of
public information, the conceptual relation between disagreement and uncertainty, as
well as in the elds of forecasting in general, and early-warning systems in particular.
A detailed literature survey from the various elds serves to establish a conceptual
framework for us to think broadly about the role of aggregate belief heterogeneity.7
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1 Introduction
The dramatic unfolding of events in the autumn of 2008 revealed deeply rooted
sources of systemic vulnerability within a nancial system which had actually been
praised for years to be itself an essential determinant of risk containment and stabil-
ity. As it became apparent that the main source of the credit and liquidity crunches
which brought the economy to the slippery slope lay in the balance sheet interlinkages
which dened the system and not only in the risk management practices of individual
agents, the need for a systemic approach to supervision and regulation quickly came
to dominate the public discourse. Policy makers and regulatory authorities in the
sequel strive to put in place a system of supervisory bodies with the task of recog-
nizing and containing systemic risks. In this paper we attempt to contribute to this
ongoing eort towards dening the limits of a conceptual framework within which
one can think about system-wide vulnerability. Building on the theoretical advances
which we review in Section 2, our goal is to highlight the fact that cross-sectional
survey measures of belief heterogeneity could prove useful in terms of assessing the
resilience of the economy as a whole.1
We aim to advance and substantiate empirically the hypothesis that levels of
aggregate disagreement have the potential to impact the economy's vulnerability to
exogenous shocks. Our hypothesis thus involves the assumption that changing levels
of agreement do not, as such, cause the economy to switch between high-, medium-,
or low-growth regimes but instead inuence the propensity of the economy to switch
between dierent regimes. The results suggests that higher levels of agreement about
the future course of the economy make the transition from welfare-superior regimes
to welfare-inferior ones more likely.
Appropriate measures of disagreement could thus also be meaningful indicators
for the purpose of assessing nancial stability. As of yet, focus has been on inter-
est rates, interest rate spreads, various measures of volatility, and so forth, which
may well be able to signal stress in nancial markets - stress having arisen, however,
means that the market was vulnerable already prior to the arrival of a shock. Dis-
agreement measures are dierent in nature since they tend to signal tranquility prior
1The topic is also subject of interest in ECB (2011).8
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to a potential downturn, while this calmness can be reective of high vulnerability.
The data and econometric methodology are described in Section 3. We propose
a simple and transparent measure of disagreement that can be derived from sur-
vey data (the Michigan Survey of Consumers) on expected real economic activity.
For quantifying disagreement we employ a measure of the cross-sectional dispersion
in agents' beliefs about the expected course of the real economy (with regard to
employment or business conditions) in the near future.
We estimate a three-regime endogenous switching model in Section 4, for two
cases: US GDP growth and realized volatility in US stock markets. The transition
probabilities that are associated with switching between the three regimes are allowed
to be a function of economy-wide disagreement. Based on the estimated models, we
then simulate the US economy under the counterfactual assumptions of constant
high and constant low disagreement in the long-run, so as to shed further light on
dierences in distributional characteristics of GDP growth and realized stock market
volatility conditional on the prevailing levels of belief heterogeneity. Moreover, we
provide an evaluation of simulated out-of-sample predictions in order to assess how
both the regime-switching as well as the disagreement measure to condition the
transition process help improve forecast accuracy.
2 Literature review
2.1 Heterogeneity, leverage and volatility
Economic agents, though acting entirely rational in a stochastic environment, may
still be able to process information only at a limited rate, therefore diering in
their probability distributions. Indeed, especially since detailed household survey
data has become available for most developed countries, the connection between the
heterogeneity in information sets, expectations, nancial sophistication, literacy or
analytical ability and the market-relevant behavior concerning nancial planning,
consumption or labor allocation is increasingly under scrutiny. Our primary concern
in this section is to present a series of ideas and arguments pertaining to these eects.9
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Early in the development of modern nance, it has been noted that the hetero-
geneity in beliefs across market participants can have important eects on prices
because, for example in the presence of short-sales constraints, the price of the asset
reects the valuation of the most optimistic buyers and thus disagreement is as-
sociated with higher prices, speculation and increased volatility (Miller (1977) and
Harrison and Kreps (1978)). Since then, a series of papers have analyzed the impli-
cations of disagreement on nancial variables in more detail (see e.g. Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003)). Nimark (2010) is part of the recent eorts to complement empir-
ical evidence. He nds substantial evidence for heterogeneous beliefs and speculative
behavior across the term structure of US bond yields and shows that even if the esti-
mated amount of heterogeneity is small, speculative trade driven by the individually
perceived mispricing of bonds can be quantitatively important. Yu (2011) arrives at
similar conclusions by analyzing individual-stock analyst forecast dispersion.
The role of heterogeneous beliefs has also been advanced in terms of explaining
the evolutions which led to the recent nancial and economic crisis. Sims (2009)
noted rst that dierences of opinion about the future course of ination generates
over-investment in the real asset, thus implying that monetary policy could con-
tribute to the appearance of bubble-like phenomena by acting or communicating in
such a way as to cause divergences in beliefs. The same idea is applied to housing
market dynamics by Tomura (2009), who shows that boom-bust cycles as the one
the US has experienced during the 2000-2010 decade in housing markets, can occur
endogenously if credit-constrained borrowers become overly optimistic and this ex-
pectation is neither shared by lenders, nor realized ex post. Favara and Song (2009)
note that the nature of the housing stock and the possibility of renting amounts to
a de facto short-sale constraint. So, considering this non-linearity in the demand for
housing, the equilibrium house prices then reect only the expectations of optimistic
agents and are consistently biased upwards.
The analysis of Tian and Yan (2009) concerns the nancial roots of the crisis
and the role of heterogeneous beliefs in this context: "[T]he market for forward-type
securities is rather resilient in the sense that, for a reasonable range of parameters,
there is almost always a seller of the security, especially if beliefs are diverse. The
market for option-type contracts, however, appears to be more vulnerable in that the10
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supply of the security may dry up quickly when the underlying asset value experiences
a drastic shock (p. 2)". Compared to the previously mentioned setups in which
information ows were seen to be constant, Tian and Yan (2009) are among the
rst to ask about the eects of time-variation in expectations. First of all, in their
framework it still holds that disagreement generates trade, but an additional second
element enters in that a subsequent alignment of information sets, coupled with the
presence of negative shocks may cause the market to freeze, break down and then
resume as the fundamental conditions slowly improve. As quoted above, this eect
is shown to be of acute relevance in particular for tranched securities like the ones
that were intensively traded before the crisis.
The Geanakoplos (2009) view on the crisis as an end to a leverage cycle is also
connected along similar lines with the presence of disagreement. The crucial ele-
ment of his analysis is the fact that optimists bid the prices up in good times and
bear all losses in the event of a crash, with leveraged buyers forced to sell in order
to meet margin requirements, which depresses asset prices and tightens collateral
requirements even further. In addition to this basic mechanism through which dis-
agreement aects the economy, Geanakoplos (2009) opens the door for two more
ideas which we will be concerned with in the next section. First, he notes that: "The
point of the leverage cycle is that excess leverage followed by excessive deleveraging
will cause a crash even before there has been a crash in the fundamentals, and even
if there is no subsequent crash in the fundamentals (p. 26)." This connects with
our focus on the notion of vulnerability in this paper, as opposed to systemic risk or
nancial stress. What matters to us are these expectational ex ante eects, namely
the inherent vulnerability of the system with respect to the updating of information
sets, the revision of beliefs and the consequent market-relevant actions. Second, he
writes: "The idea is that at the beginning, everyone thinks the chances of ultimate
failure require too many things to go wrong to be of any substantial probability.
There is little uncertainty, and therefore little room for disagreement. Once enough
things go wrong to raise the spectre of real trouble, the uncertainty goes way up
in everyone's mind, and so does the possibility of disagreement (p. 7)." As we will
show in the context of our empirical exercise, this way of thinking about news and
coordinated actions is well matched by observed data.11
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2.2 Social value of public information
Since the seminal contribution of Hirshleifer (1971), the literature on the social value
of public information has grown considerably. In recent years, in particular the
welfare-reducing properties of public information have attracted research interest
(see e.g. Morris and Shin (2002) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007)). While not
focusing directly on disagreement, these models complement the discussion from the
previous subsection with a decisive insight: If agents overweigh the public signal
in their expectation formation process, this may lower the incentive to exert eort
in collecting costly private information, thereby increasing the chance of individual
investment mistakes and reducing social welfare. The collateral eect of this herding
on public information is to decrease the cross-sectional dispersion of beliefs, which
does not per se have an impact upon equilibrium dynamics, but is an indication of
sub-optimal behavior.
In this regard, of particular importance is the contribution by Veldkamp (2006),
who builds on the benchmark model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and shows that
information markets are prone to frenzies and herds as a direct consequence of the
non-rival nature of information. Her main insight is that an increase in demand for
a particular piece of information in a competitive market does not cause a rise in the
market price like in the case of limited-supply assets, but instead the information
gets traded at even lower prices, the more the desirability of this information gets
acknowledged by the information providers. Agents thus end up buying the same
information that others are buying - just like in the class of models mentioned above,
except that in this case the public or private nature of any particular bit of informa-
tion is determined endogenously. Again, disagreement decreases as more information
of a particular sort becomes available, thereby indicating (but not implying, since
the causality is not bi-directional) a possible herding tendency due to the abundance
of this particular low-cost informational content and resulting in gradual booms and
sudden crashes.
Gala and Volpin (2010) analyze the social value of information in a nancial setup
in which individual investment decisions impose a negative externality on others, due
to the limited availability of capital and the need for renancing. They highlight12
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the possible reduction in social welfare which is a result of the provision of public
(low-cost) information. If debtors do not internalize the equilibrium eects that their
choices have on others and competitive nanciers are better o nancing all projects,
since they earn ex post rents in the event of capital shortages and costly renancing,
then a higher correlation in the ex ante perceived nancing needs of agents may result
in a reduction of overall resources available for renancing: "Public information,
while acting as information equalizer which reduces any information gaps among
entrepreneurs, directs all entrepreneurs towards the same action and, thereby, may
trigger systemic liquidity shortages (p. 24)."
We conclude this subsection by referring to an additional strand of the litera-
ture that we deem relevant for interpreting our empirical ndings: The connection
between diversity, innovation and technological progress (Akcigit and Kerr (2010)
and Acemoglu (2011)). A well established fact in the economics of innovation is the
heterogeneity of R&D choices in terms of creating new products and opening new
markets on one side (exploration) as well as improving and extending current product
lines or market structures (exploitation) on the other, with the exploratory activi-
ties of entrants and small rms generating spillover eects and thereby stimulating
economic growth more than proportionally (Akcigit and Kerr (2010)). Acemoglu
(2011) shows that the diversity of research patterns is one of the factors contributing
to more activities of this exploratory type. He also shows that there are natu-
ral market mechanisms (entry costs, prot maximization, short-term orientation of
management) leading to too little research diversity which is detrimental to social
welfare. However, he also identies a potential remedy to the problem by suggesting
that "a counteracting force against the potential lack of diversity in research may be
the diversity of researchers: because of dierent competences, beliefs or preferences,
researchers may choose to direct their research towards areas that are under-explored
by others and this may partially redress the ineciently low level of diversity of re-
search in the market economy (p. 1)." In other words, the market may often work
such as to reward too much conformity and too little diversity, with all or the major-
ity of R&D activities devoted to developing the same research agenda - while higher
diversity of researchers, for example with respect to their interests and competences,
can induce a more diverse research portfolio and thus foster economic growth. We13
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use these ideas somewhat detached from their initial breeding ground in order to
understand the inuence of heterogeneous beliefs on the probability to switch be-
tween dierent macroeconomic or nancial regimes, while the point remains however
the same: learning from the success of others (herding or informational herding) can
make economic activities (or investments or insurance schemes) more concentrated
and thus more vulnerable, while heterogeneity can spur innovation, exploration and
growth.
2.3 Disagreement and uncertainty
It has become standard in economic theory to consider as a base unit of analysis
the dynamic decision of agents acting in a stochastic environment. The perceived
uncertainty associated with future realizations of the stochastic processes is then the
decisive element in terms of understanding the determinants of market prices and
the policy trade-os. Ex post, one can then always measure the realized volatility of
a random variable by using in-sample statistical analysis. However, the assumption
that ex ante uncertainty can be proxied by ex post volatility is quite heroic. In
response to this problem, a wide series of measures of ex ante uncertainty have been
proposed, by referring to either market data such as futures or spreads or survey
data. For our purposes, it is particularly relevant that a close connection between
belief heterogeneity and perceived uncertainty has been documented.
Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) found evidence for this positive relationship by
using the NBER-ASA survey; Bomberger (1996) conrmed the ndings by using the
Livingston survey - Rich and Butler (1998) and Bomberger (1999) are examples of
the debate ensueing in the literature in this regard - with Giordani and Soderlind
(2003) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010) recently rening our understanding of both
the theoretical perspective and the empirical evidence. Pfajfar and Zakelj (2011)
complement the discussion by providing experimental evidence.
Overall, most studies nd that about 50% of the variation in uncertainty is ex-
plained by appropriate measures of disagreement; thus we conclude that disagreement
is an imperfect yet useful proxy for ex ante perceived uncertainty. We interpret, at
least up to a certain degree, periods of high disagreement to be associated with high14
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perceived uncertainty and periods of low disagreement to reect a perception of the
future as rather stable.
2.4 Forecasting and early warning systems
Forecasting business cycle dynamics from reduced form econometric models has a
long tradition, a very wide eld in the literature to which Stock and Watson (2003)
is a useful entry point. A subset of the forecasting literature is the eld about early
warning systems, which are models that aim to provide estimates of the probability
of a binary event, such as of a crisis in foreign exchange markets, the banking sys-
tem, or at the micro level the bankruptcy of individual rms or nancial institutions.
Probit and logit, as well as discriminant analyses are the dominant econometric ap-
proaches in this eld. Cox-proportional hazard models (see e.g. Cox (1972) and
Whalem (1991)) have the advantage that besides providing a measure of the prob-
ability of a crisis event, they also allow an assessment as to its timing, while only
weak assumptions have to be imposed on the distribution of the time to failure.
Additional benchmark contributions to the early-warning literature are Flood and
Marion (1999), Borio and Lowe (2002), Worrell (2004), Davis and Karim (2008), and
more recently Almanides (2011).
The conclusion from surveying the literature on forecasting and early-warning
systems is that measures of cross-sectional heterogeneity in beliefs are virtually absent
from the analysis; when included however, they prove to have rather strong predictive
capacity and valuable informational content.
Buraschi and Whelan (2010) show that Blue Chip survey measures of belief het-
erogeneity are positively correlated with bond term premia and are able to forecast
bond returns, with the marginal forecasting contribution proving to be very robust
after controlling for a range of risk and liquidity measures. Their conclusion is that
disagreement contains important information about expected returns that is not
captured in historical levels of macro or nancial variables.
Legerstee and Franses (2010) also nd the cross-sectional distribution of beliefs
to contain useful information for forecasting, in particular when used in Markov-15
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switching models. They use data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters and
they are also to the best of our knowledge the only ones having documented empiri-
cally that the degree of disagreement could signal upcoming structural or temporal
changes in an economic process.
Finally, Buchmann (2010) uses data from the European Commission Business and
Consumer survey and shows that disagreement can well compete with a wide set of
other possible explanatory variables (macroeconomic and nancial market variables)
when it comes to forecasting real activity in the euro area. A supplementary analysis
that aims to extract probabilities of the 2009 recession from a pre-crisis perspective
proves that the very low level of disagreement just before the advent of the nancial
crisis (a level that was observed to that extent the last time in May 1993) leads the
model to predict a strong downturn for the years ahead, at a time when conditions
in nancial markets were still relatively calm. The evaluation of simulated out-of-
sample forecasts based on the models presented in the present paper will conrm
that disagreement measures contain useful information for predicting real activity
also for the US economy.
In the present paper, we propose to employ measures of belief heterogeneity as
additional tools in the broad analytical framework used to assess nancial and eco-
nomic vulnerability. The underlying rationale for why higher levels of agreement, i.e.
less heterogeneous beliefs, shall elevate the vulnerability of the economy as a whole is
that economic agents tend to eect insurance against possible future shocks in a more
homogeneous fashion the more they agree about the future course of the economy.
As an example, say the vast majority of the population was considering a severe
downturn in the near future rather unlikely (maybe because we were experiencing a
prolonged period of robust positive growth) - precautionary savings to ensure against
a sudden fall in real income, e.g. as a result of loss of employment, would in the
sequel be more homogeneously chosen, compared to times when such events are per-
ceived more likely to occur. Should an exogenous shock then materialize, a relatively
higher fraction of agents will experience a relatively more pronounced loss in real
income. Aggregate activity would possibly start to deteriorate quite sharply, more
so compared to when there had been more disagreement, and hence more diverse
insurance, before the arrival of the shock. An exogenous shock might e.g. come as16
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a sudden, higher than expected rise in interest rates so that the re-nancing of debt
becomes more costly, which some agents may not be able to aord any longer so that
they might have to declare bankruptcy.
On the other hand, as we have mentioned in the previous subsection, disagree-
ment measures contain information which seem to go beyond those contained in
macroeconomic aggregates. Thus, our point is not only that cross-sectional belief
heterogeneity can determine cross-sectional variation in insurance mechanisms, but
that the structure of beliefs per se has the potential to impact macroeconomic out-
comes, through generating e.g. correlated belief revisions and liquidity shortages.
3 Data and econometric methodology
3.1 Data
As a measure of real activity we employ annual growth in quarterly real GDP in
the US covering the period from 1978Q1 - 2010Q3 (131 observations). The second
main ingredient is a measure of dispersion in expected changes in real activity which
we derive from selected questions contained in the Michigan Surveys of Consumer
Attitudes (SCA).2
The benchmark model estimates for output growth to be presented in Section 4
are based on Question 17 from the business condition section of the survey which is
phrased as follows:
How about people out of work during the coming 12 months { do you think that
there will be more unemployment than now, about the same or less?3
2The SCA is conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The
survey is monthly, including at least 500 interviews, and contains about 50 questions addressing
in particular the consumers' own nancial situation as well as their views on the outlook for the
economy as a whole in both the near future and the long term. We convert the monthly survey data
to quarterly, which is the frequency with which we set up and estimate all models. Other sources
for expectations, such as the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) are not considered in this
paper. The justication for using consumers' instead of professional forecasters' expectations as a
reference for the analysis is that we consider the consumer expectations more representative of the
population as a whole, and therefore more relevant for determining macroeconomic outcomes.
3The SCA also contains a question related to expectations at the 5-year horizon. However, we17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1407
December 2011
Answers from among which the respondent can choose include 1) more unemploy-
ment, 2) about the same, 3) less unemployment, or 4) do not know. From micro-level
data we rst compute the number of respondents in each category, excluding however
the fourth category.4
Since the answer to the question is categorical in nature, we do not compute a
plain standard deviation for obtaining a measure of disagreement since we would
have to assume that the distances between answer categories be quantiable and
equal. We refrain from assuming that answer categories are equally far from one













where the F i
t are the cumulative relative frequencies for the i-th category at time
t. Note that i runs only up to 2 because the cumulative frequency including the third
category equals 1 and does therefore not contain additional information about the
distribution of the response shares. We refer the reader to Lacy (2006) for further
details about this ordinal dispersion measure.
A time series plot of GDP growth along with the disagreement measure and
NBER dated recessions can be found in Figure 1. All ve NBER recession periods in
the sample have been preceded by a continual rise in agreement. The disagreement
index falls to a local trough in 1979Q3 (d = 0:2), with the peak of the business
cycle following in 1980Q1. The expansion period between the trough in 1980Q3 and
1981Q4 is associated with the index falling from 0.90 down to 0.54. All subsequent
expansion periods between 1982Q4 - 1990Q3, 1991Q1 - 2001Q1, and until the out-
break of the most recent recession period in 2007Q4 are accompanied by pronounced
upward trending levels of agreement. During the intermediate contraction periods,
consider the shorter (here 1-year horizon) the more relevant planning horizon for households and
therefore a more meaningful measure for the analysis that we aim to conduct.
4Answer shares from the remaining three categories are re-scaled so that they sum to 1 in every
period.
5We use the same measure in Badarinza and Buchmann (2009), where the ordinal dispersion is
also compared to alternative standard deviation type measures that are based on quantied survey
expectations.18
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there is a clear tendency for more disagreement to build up.
To substantiate the hypothesis that varying levels of disagreement can as well
be reective of vulnerability of nancial markets, we will estimate a second regime-
switching model, with the target variable being a measure of realized volatility in
US stock markets. The measure is derived from daily S&P500 index data covering
the period from 03/01/1978 - 31/03/2010 (8122 observations), from which realized
volatilities are computed using a 1-quarter window of compounded returns. The
resulting quarterly sample covers the same period as the GDP model (131 obser-
vations).6 Figure 1 (lower panel) shows the realized volatility measure along with
the measure of disagreement in expectations which is, in this case, derived from an
alternative question (Q13) from the SCA:
How about a year from now, do you expect that in the country as a whole, business
conditions will be better, or worse than they are at present, or just about the same?
As a benchmark, the business condition related question is in our view better
suited for the analysis in the context of nancial market developments.
NBER recession periods tend to be associated with rising volatility in stock mar-
kets. An exception is the fourth quarter of 1987, when volatility appeared to jump
signicantly without having been accompanied by a downturn in real activity.7
An alternative measure that has been used to measure disagreement in expec-
tations is the Herndahl index, see e.g. Li and Li (2010). The negative Hernd-
ahl indices based on the two survey questions Q13 and Q17 are correlated with
the Lacy-type disagreement measures by 99.2% and 93.9%, respectively. Model re-
sults presented in Section 4 remain robust when replacing the Lacy-based by the
Herndahl-based disagreement measures.
6The rationale for estimating the realized volatility model with a quarterly frequency is that we
consider it the business cycle frequency. It has also been chosen to have a model structure that is
comparable to the models for GDP growth presented in the paper.
7On 19 October 1987, stock markets around the world crashed, starting in Hong Kong and then
spreading west-wards through European markets to the US. The S&P 500 dropped by 20.4%; other
indices, alike, fell by amounts exceeding historic records. Soon after the crash, markets started to
rally again, with gains that had not previously been observed within a single day. The fact that
the collapse of markets in the US was not to trigger a recession has been attributed, by and large,
to the FED's policy.19
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3.2 Regime-switching models with endogenous transition
probabilities
For the purpose of assessing the extent to which the level of agreement has an impact
on the propensity of the economy to switch regimes, we employ a regime-switching
(RS) model approach, that is, we allow the model dynamics that govern the evolution
of yt to depend on a discrete-valued, latent regime process st.
yt = 0;st +
P X
p=1
p;styt p + t (2)






. The regime indicator st can assume integer values between 1;:::;R where
R is the number of regimes that the intercept, the autoregressive dynamics and the
residual variances are allowed to switch between.
For the latent st we assume the following extended Markov-process
P (st+1 = kjst = j;Zt) = pjk;t (3)
The transition probability pjk;t is time-varying as a result of its endogenous de-
pendence on a vector-valued Zt, which shall contain our measure of disagreement,
an intercept, and more conditioning variables if so desired. We follow Diebold et al.
(1994) and employ a logit model scheme for parameterizing the transition process,






where jk is a vector of parameters per each cell (j;k) in the transition matrix,
capturing the dependence of pjk;t on Zt.
For the purpose of estimation of the RS model, we employ the Expectation-
Maximization (EM) algorithm, as outlined in Diebold et al. (1994), yet developing it20
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1407
December 2011
for the generic R-regime case and embedding a direct numerical optimization for the
sake of solving the rst-order conditions to derive estimates for .8 The EM algorithm
involves two iterative procedures to obtain ltered and one-step-ahead ltered prob-
abilities (via a forward iteration), as well as a series of smoothed probabilities (via a
backward iteration) that let us infer with what probability the economy prevails in
each of the R regimes throughout the sample period.9
4 Empirical ndings
Model estimates that we present in the following subsections will involve the Zt
comprising either a raw measure of disagreement, as dened in equation (1), or
a ltered version thereof. The ltered disagreement measure is a residual from a
regression of the raw disagreement series dt on a comprehensive set of variables
capturing macro and nancial conditions in the US economy, including e.g. GDP
growth, private investment growth, a personal savings rate, a measure of capacity
utilization, and others. See Table 1 for the results from two auxiliary regressions,
respectively for disagreement based on Question 13 and 17 from the Michigan Survey.
The rationale for employing a residual from such lter equations as an alterna-
tive disagreement metric is that it shall be free of information that other indicators
convey about the state of the economy. The residual disagreement is by construction
orthogonal to all variables included in the lter equation. Note that the two lter
equations comprise also a level expectation variable (and its square), constructed
from the respective survey question, which is computed as the share to the positive
answer minus the share to the negative answer, excluding the share to the 'remain
equal' category.
Figure 2 shows the raw and residual disagreement series. Residual disagreement
appears still to have the cyclical prole that we can observe for raw disagreement;
8Diebold et al. (1994) provide closed-form solutions for the case when R = 2 and Z contains no
more than three variables by employing a rst-order Taylor series expansion around the parameters
that govern the transition probabilities.
9For details about the EM algorithm in general see in particular Dempster et al. (1977). For its
use in the time-series model context, see e.g. Hamilton (1994) for the exogenous and Diebold et al.
(1994) for the case of endogenous transition processes.21
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with more agreement gradually building up throughout expansion periods, and quick
adjustment to higher disagreement levels in the course of a recession.
4.1 Real activity
Tables 2 and 3 present the model estimates for US GDP growth based on the sample
from 1978Q1-2010Q3. Figure 3 shows the corresponding smoothed regime probability
estimates. While allowing the intercept and residual variance to switch across three
regimes, the autoregressive dynamics are yet constrained to be equal across regimes,
so as to mimic the original Hamilton (1989) model scheme.10 Instead of referring to
estimates for , we report the -implied transition probabilities at selected moments
of the disagreement distribution.
For the model involving the raw disagreement measure (Table 2, Panel A), the
estimated conditional means per regime equal [4.6,2.5,-0.6]%, thus we refer to them
as strong expansion, medium growth, and recession. For the model based on ltered
disagreement, the conditional mean estimates equal [4.8, 2.7,-0.8]%.
Based on the model involving the raw disagreement measure, the endogenous
transition matrix estimates (Table 2, Panel B) reveal the following patterns: The
probability of moving from medium growth to a recession equals an estimated 84%
at times of high agreement, as opposed to virtually 0% at times of high disagreement;
The probability of remaining in a medium-growth regime equals an estimated 16%
and 45% at times of maximum agreement and disagreement, respectively. Continu-
ance within a strong expansion regime is more likely at times of maximum agreement
(91% when full agreement vs. 65% when full disagreement). Estimated error bounds
(Figures 6 and 7) suggest that the implied probabilities respectively at minimum
and maximum disagreement are statistically dierent at conventional levels of sig-
nicance.
10To facilitate the estimation, in particular to allow for the application of the EM algorithm, we
follow a two-step approach to estimation. Step 1: Estimate the 3-regime switching model (with
endogenous transition process via Z) while yet excluding autoregressive lags. Step 2: Take the
residuals from Step 1 and estimate an autoregressive model (of optimal order chosen according to
the Bayesian information criterion) without regime-switching. Further note that the autoregressive
coecient estimates are not reported in the tables; only the mean estimates are reported.22
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When instead employing the ltered disagreement measure (Table 3, Panel B),
the Z-dependent transition matrix estimates suggest that switching from medium-
growth to recession at times of high agreement has a 15% probability, while at times
of full disagreement that probability would fall to 5%. Compared to the estimates
based on raw disagreement, the variation in that probability induced by disagreement
has therefore become tighter (and somewhat less signicant - see also Figures 8 and
9), while however still suggesting a threefold rise in that probability when migrating
from high disagreement towards high agreement. More meaningful appear now the
estimates for switching from strong expansion right to a recession period; when based
on raw disagreement, we obtain an estimated probability of 13% for that scenario
under high disagreement, while the model estimates based on ltered disagreement
suggest a quasi-zero probability all along the disagreement distribution.
These dierences in estimates for the transition probabilities are of course con-
form with the estimated smooth regime probabilities (since the former are a function
of the latter), as depicted in the Figure 3. The model involving raw disagreement
suggests a rather direct switch from strong expansion to recession at some points
over the sample period, e.g. in 1981Q3-Q4. The model based on ltered disagree-
ment considers the period from 1979-1981Q3 rather a medium growth period that is
then followed by a recession state in 1981Q4 with 61%, and in 1982Q1 with 99.9%
probability. Otherwise, results for staying in medium growth regimes conditional
on high agreement or disagreement prevailing appear robust when employing the
ltered disagreement measure: at times of high agreement, we remain in medium
growth with 57% probability, opposed to 92% at times of high disagreement.
For the model including raw disagreement, the ergodic probabilities, that is, the
long-run means of the growth-regimes that are now depending on the prevailing level
of agreement equal, under the assumption of high disagreement in the long-run, to
[54,33,13]%, and under the assumption of full agreement in the long-run to [0,2,98]%
(Table 2, Panel B). These estimates would suggest that in 100 years, we would be
experiencing 54, 33, and 13 years respectively in strong positive, medium positive
growth, and recession regimes if there was constant high disagreement. If instead
there was steady agreement in the long-run, we would spend two years cumulative
in either medium or strong expansion periods and about 98 years in recession. Er-23
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godic probabilities implied by the median level of disagreement equal [42,46,12]%,
i.e. imply a quite balanced distribution for strong and medium-growth episodes, and
12 out of 100 years to be spent in recession.
Ergodic probabilities should certainly be interpreted with caution, since the as-
sumption of from now on ever-lasting constant full agreement or disagreement is
obviously verily hypothetical and would bring about structural changes that may
imply an evolution of growth regimes that dier from such estimates. They do,
however, lead to the same conclusions that we draw from the estimated endoge-
nous transition matrix and are meant to clarify the role of dispersion in beliefs for
qualifying transition probabilities: disagreement appears to render the economy less
vulnerable, recessions less likely, and growth more sustainable in the long-run.
In the top panel of Table 8 we report in-sample measures of t for the GDP growth
variable, extended by further benchmark models where we restrict the regimes back
to one. We see that allowing for regime-specic dynamics signicantly improves the
t of the model, with the marginal contribution from identifying the three regimes
separately amounting to 15pp of additional variation in GDP growth that the model
can explain. Allowing the transition process to depend endogenously on the disagree-
ment level leads to a further improvement in the model t, with the log-likelihood
ratio to the AR benchmark being in all cases statistically signicant at least at the
1% condence level.
4.2 Volatility in stock markets
The RS model estimates and resulting endogenous transition probabilities are re-
ported in Table 4 and plotted along with estimated error bounds in Figures 8 and
9. Unlike for GDP growth, now not only the intercept and residual variances but
all autoregressive coecients are allowed to switch, i.e. the entirety of the model's
parameter space can be distinct across regimes.11
11Two autoregressive lags have been judged to be sucient to capture persistence within the
regimes. With more than two lags, our experience was that for the high volatility regime that is
identied for about six quarters in the sample, the models would produce too high, that is, almost
'perfect', in-sample t, thus rendering residuals in that regime virtually zero and in the sequel
causing the likelihood to diverge to innity.24
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The conditional means per regime which are obtained as a weighted average of
observed realized volatility, where weights are the smooth probabilities per regime,
equal [36.8,17.7,12.0]pp (annualized) for the model involving the raw disagreement
measure, thus we refer to the states as high, medium, and low volatility regimes.
There is a clear tendency for the autoregressive dynamics to become more persis-
tent, that is, more lags become signicant when migrating from higher towards lower
volatility regimes. For the model including ltered disagreement, the conditional
means per regime equal [38.3,17.8,11.4] percentage points; which is close to the esti-
mates based on raw disagreement.
As regards the endogenous transition probabilities, the following patterns can be
observed for the raw disagreement model: The probability of moving from medium to
high volatility regimes equals 14% and 3% at times of maximum agreement, disagree-
ment respectively. The probability of switching from low directly to high volatility
regimes equals 68% and virtually 0% at times of full agreement, disagreement re-
spectively. The probability of staying in the medium volatility regime equals 58%
and 84% respectively at times of high agreement and disagreement. After all, also
prevalence within the low volatility state is more sustainable at times of full disagree-
ment (97% compared to 13% at times of full agreement). All nine probabilities in the
transition matrix (Figure 8), appear to depend on agreement levels to a statistically
signicant extent. When using the ltered disagreement measure instead (see Table
5, Panel B and Figure 9), six of nine probabilities in the transition matrix appear to
depend signicantly on disagreement levels.
The estimated disagreement-dependent ergodic probabilities, based on raw dis-
agreement (Table 4, Panel B), once more conrm the ndings: The thought exper-
iment of living through 100 years would imply that we spend 30, 32, and 38 years
respectively in high, medium, and low volatility regimes when there was constant
high agreement, as opposed to 1, 18, and 81 years when there was high disagreement
in the long run. These estimates compare to [32,37,32]% and [1,13,86]% respectively
under constant high agreement and disagreement, for the model including the l-
tered disagreement measure. They are broadly in line with the estimates based on
raw disagreement.
The hypothesis that disagreement levels are reective of the degree of vulnera-25
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bility of nancial markets therefore receives empirical support, too. In particular,
switches straight from a low to a high volatility regime, without intermediate visit
of a medium volatility regime, appear to be more likely at times of high agreement,
with high disagreement levels being able to let that probability approach zero.12
In view of the nding that one of the three regimes is explosive, and to further
assess the robustness of the ndings presented so far, we also estimate a version of
the model where realized volatility enters in rst dierences. Results are presented
in Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 10 and 11. The model dynamics are here allowed
to switch between only two regimes, the reason being that a third regime could not
be separately identied.13 Moreover, one autoregressive lag has now been sucient
to capture persistence, which is actually signicant in only one of the regimes. We
refrain from discussing the results for that additional model in detail, and merely con-
clude that the role of disagreement in qualifying the transition probabilities remains
robust.
As we report in the middle panel of Table 8, allowing for regime-specic dynam-
ics leads to a strong improvement in the in-sample t of the model: The portion
of variation in volatility explained by the model increases from 27% in the case of
a simple autoregressive process to 81% when considering the three distinct endoge-
nous regimes. This fact is mirrored by the log-likelihood ratio relative to the AR
benchmark, which suggests a statistically signicant improvement at least at a 1%
condence level. The bottom panel of Table 8 shows the in-sample measures for
the models comprising the rst dierences of volatility. The results suggest that the
RS model for volatility in dierences (opposed to the model in levels) results in a
relatively smaller gain with regard to in-sample t, with the additional portion of
variation explained being merely 7pp.
12As a robustness check, we have as well changed the underlying questions and used Q17 for the
volatility and Q13 for the GDP growth model. Results presented in Section 4 remain robust. More-
over, we have as well considered disagreement measures based on other forward-looking questions
from the survey: Q6 about the expected nancial situation and Q9 about real family income. Based
on Q9, results for either model context remain robust, both qualitatively/quantitatively. The anal-
ysis based on Q6 disagreement (for both models) is the only context in which transition probability
dependencies were found to not be signicantly dierent when conditioning on high disagreement,
high agreement respectively.
13Again, imposing three regimes would here result in too high in-sample t for one of three
regimes which eventually causes the likelihood to diverge to innity.26
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4.3 Stochastic simulations
We now employ one model estimate per context (the GDP growth and realized
volatility in US stock markets), both of them based on the respective ltered dis-
agreement measures, and simulate articial data for a series of 10,000 periods under
the counterfactual assumption of steady high versus steady low disagreement. The
resulting simulated paths as well as respective kernel density distribution charts are
presented in Figures 12 and 13. Selected moments of the distributions are summa-
rized in Table 9.
For the GDP growth model, we have chosen the 1% and 99% quantile of the
ltered disagreement distribution under which the economy is simulated. The long
run medians under high agreement and high disagreement equal 0.8% and 2.7%
GDP growth year-on-year. The dispersion around the mean is about 2.5 times as
large under full agreement, i.e. the amplitude of the business cycle is on average
considerably higher under high agreement. The estimated interquartile ranges, 4.9pp
and 1.6pp under high agreement and disagreement, respectively, conrm this nding.
For the volatility model, the 25% and 75% quantiles of the ltered disagreement
distribution have been taken to derive the implied transition matrix, under which
the volatility in US stock markets has then been simulated. The medians under high
agreement and disagreement suggest that high agreement induces higher volatility on
average in the long run (14.6 vs 12.0 annualized pp volatility). The distribution under
agreement is more skewed to the right, i.e. towards higher volatility (skewness equals
11.8 and 5.9 under high agreement and disagreement respectively). The estimated
kurtosis conrms that the simulated distribution under agreement has much longer
tails, that is, a much larger portion of the variance is driven by infrequent extreme
deviations from the center of the volatility distribution.
4.4 Out-of-sample forecasting
In addition to examining the models' performance in capturing the variables' dynam-
ics in-sample, we assess the models' performance in forecasting out-of-sample. The
respective rst of the three pairs of models for GDP growth, realized volatility and27
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volatility in rst dierences, i.e. the ones involving the raw disagreement measures,
are used to produce recursive out-of-sample forecasts over the period from 2002Q1-
2010Q3. An expanding window scheme is chosen, that is, we let the sample start
in 1978Q1 and only the forecast origin to move recursively, with the models being
re-estimated at each point to then produce a set of one up to four quarter ahead
forecasts.14
Five model schemes are considered for each variable:
1. AR model containing the target variable only
2. Bivariate VAR model containing the target variable and the disagreement mea-
sure
3. RS model for the target variable only
4. RS model for the target variable, with the transition probabilities being a
function of disagreement, conditional on a predicted out-of-sample disagree-
ment path (via an auxiliary AR model), which is used to derive the transition
matrix (recursively over the horizon) and thereby the out-of-sample regime
probabilities
5. RS model for the target variable, with the transition probabilities being a
function of disagreement and disagreement held x along the out-of-sample
horizon to derive the transition matrix and thereby the out-of-sample regime
probabilities.
The lag lengths of the AR and the VAR models, including the auxiliary AR model
for predicting disagreement in model Scheme 4, are allowed to vary over time. The
Bayesian information criterion is used to choose the lag length between a minimum
zero and maximum four over the test period.
Tables 10 and 11 show the forecast evaluation results for the three groups of
models, respectively for the full test period (35 periods) and a reduced window for
14At the outset of the test period, the forecast origin is adjusted (the very rst to 2001Q1) so
as to obtain the same number of one- up to four-period ahead forecasts over the 35-quarter test
sample.28
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the recession period, starting at the peak of the US business cycle in 2007Q4 and
then covering the remaining quarters until 2010Q3 (12 periods).
Referring to the results for GDP growth in Table 10, the VAR model with dis-
agreement reduces Root Mean Square Forecast Errors (RMSE) relative to those
resulting from the AR benchmark by 10%-12% at short horizons of up to two quar-
ters. For the three and four-quarter horizon, the RS model including disagreement to
condition the transition probabilities performs best, with the RMSE reduced by up
to 18%. The same ranking of best-performing models results for the crisis test sample
(Table 11), for which the RMSE ratios suggest an even stronger role for disagreement
with a statistically signicant 24% improvement at the four-quarter horizon.
The proportions of correctly predicted directions of change in GDP growth con-
rm that incorporating disagreement in the model improves forecast performance
markedly, with e.g. 93% of the directions of change over the three-quarter horizon
in the recession part of the test sample foreseen correctly.
Overall, the forecast evaluation for GDP let us conclude that both the disagree-
ment variable as well as the regime-switching specication help improve out-of-
sample performance signicantly. While at short horizons the regime-switching does
not yet improve performance, where joint dynamics with disagreement are better
modeled in a one-regime VAR, the regime-switching can clearly improve performance
closer to the one-year horizon.
Evaluation results for volatility in levels reveal that the RS models' explosive third
regime indeed appears to dominate over a signicant portion of the test sample,
thereby resulting in large errors of up to 628pp at the four-quarter horizon and
eventually leading us to conclude that the model is of no avail for forecasting out-
of-sample. It has however proven useful to consider the specication for volatility
in rst dierences, for which the three RS models' regimes are both stable over the
recursive test period. The VAR model's RMSE ratio indicates a 7% improvement
at the one-quarter horizon, which is comparable however to the RS model without
the additional disagreement variable as input. Otherwise, the ve model schemes'
performances appear rather equal, both over the full test period and the reduced
recession sample, with all ratios surrounding one. Regarding direction of change29
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measures, too, all ve model schemes' performances appear limited. At the shortest
horizon, a somewhat gain can be reported for the VAR's performance, where the
presence of disagreement in the model results in 83% of one-quarter changes predicted
correctly over the recession period.
5 Conclusions
Both with respect to the evolution of the real economy and to realized volatility in
nancial markets, the hypothesis that the level of economy-wide disagreement has
the ability to qualify the propensity to continue within or switch between dierent
regimes has received clear empirical support. Rising levels of agreement make a
medium-growth expansion less probable to prevail and a transition to lower-growth
regimes more likely. Also continuance within medium-growth expansions has been
found to be more sustainable with more disagreement. Likewise, concerning the
volatility regimes in nancial markets, the model results suggest that switches from
low to high volatility regimes become considerably more likely at times of high ag-
gregate agreement.
Along with in-sample criteria of model performance, the regime-switching mod-
els' out-of-sample ability has been assessed based on an eight-year test period. The
results suggest that the regime-switching model for GDP growth, with disagreement
used to condition the transition probabilities, improves the precision of GDP projec-
tions signicantly at horizons up to four quarters, in particular so during the recession
period of 2007-2009. Out-of-sample performance of the models for realized volatil-
ity, on the other hand, appears limited. Steps towards more appropriate endogenous
modeling of disagreement (and therefore potentially towards providing more accurate
predictions for disagreement) can certainly help to further the forecast performance
in either setting. As concerns the models presented for realized volatility, despite
their failure to provide more precise out-of-sample projections, we would argue that
the models can still be of avail for the purpose of producing counterfactual scenarios
(with the projections being conditional e.g. on dierent disagreement assumptions,
or regime assumptions, or both).30
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We shall emphasize, once more, that the role of disagreement in our model frame-
work is to qualify the propensity of the economy to switch regimes, i.e. it may impact
the associated transition probabilities, while not having a direct channel through
which it could drive economy-wide output, or volatility in nancial markets. For
the economy or some particular market to switch regimes, we still have to await
the arrival of some exogenous shock, which then might cause a regime shift with a
disagreement-level dependent transition probability.
The results have been found to be robust to the deployment of raw as well as
ltered disagreement measures, with the ltering being accomplished by auxiliary
models that relate disagreement to a comprehensive set of variables that capture
macro and nancial conditions in the US economy.
While we do propose in this paper a method for controlling for eventual feed-
back eects from aggregate macroeconomic conditions to the level of disagreement,
there is still further research needed in order to properly understand these mecha-
nisms. Along the lines discussed in the literature review of our paper, the theoretical
macro model frameworks should be further developed to account for endogenous in-
formation ows, learning, signal extraction, and time-varying attention levels on the
one hand, and a sucient degree of agent heterogeneity on the other. It is only if
the modeling and empirical identication techniques explicitly embed a transmission
channel from the macroeconomy to the expectation formation process that one could
also derive implementable normative implications for central bank communication,
nancial reporting and supervision.31
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Appendix
Table 1: Filter equation estimates
DIURX DIBUSC1
coef. coef.
const. 0.3178 (0.00) const. 0.3385 (0.00)
LEXPURX -0.0147 (0.00) LEXPBUSC1 -0.0034 (0.14)
LEXPURX2 -0.0064 (0.00) LEXPBUSC12 -0.0011 (0.36)
GDP -0.0100 (0.00) GDP -0.0148 (0.00)
GPDIY 0.0016 (0.00) GPDIY 0.0019 (0.00)
PCECTPIY 0.0026 (0.01) PCECTPIY 0.0032 (0.01)
PSAVERTY -0.0017 (0.18) PSAVERTY 0.0002 (0.91)
TCUY -0.0008 (0.28) TCUY -0.0004 (0.68)
UNRATE 0.0046 (0.00) UNRATE 0.0024 (0.14)
TOTALSLY 0.0001 (0.87) TOTALSLY -0.0003 (0.53)
YLDC 0.0062 (0.00) YLDC 0.0071 (0.00)




DIURX Disagreement based on Michigan Survey Question 17
DIBUSC1 Disagreement based on Michigan Survey Question 13
LEXPURX Level expectations based on Michigan Survey Question 17
LEXPBUSC1 Level expectations based on Michigan Survey Question 13
GDP Real GDP, YoY
GPDIY Gross private domestic investment, YoY
PCECTPIY Personal Consumption Expenditures: Chain-type Price Index, YoY
PSAVERTY Personal Saving Rate, 4-quarter dierences
TCUY Capacity Utilization: Total Industry, YoY
UNRATE Civilian Unemployment Rate
TOTALSLY Total Consumer Credit Outstanding, YoY
YLDC Yield curve, 10y - Fed funds rate
M2SLY M2 Money Stock, YoY36
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Expansion 4.585 (0.00) 1.364
Medium growth 2.523 (0.00) 0.379
Recession -0.554 (0.09) 2.860
B: Estimated endogenous transition probabilities and ergodic probabilities
Disagr. Expansion Medium growth Recession Ergodic prob.
quantiles Exp Med Rec Exp Med Rec Exp Med Rec Exp Med Rec
1% .91 .09 .00 .00 .16 .84 .00 .02 .98 .00 .02 .98
25% .87 .12 .00 .07 .79 .14 .00 .07 .93 .14 .27 .59
50% .84 .15 .01 .15 .83 .02 .00 .13 .87 .42 .46 .12
75% .80 .18 .03 .25 .75 .00 .00 .23 .77 .52 .42 .07
99% .65 .21 .13 .55 .45 .00 .07 .50 .43 .54 .33 .13
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.





Expansion 4.787 (0.00) 1.430
Medium growth 2.689 (0.00) 0.656
Recession -0.756 (0.03) 2.742
B: Estimated endogenous transition probabilities and ergodic probabilities
Disagr. Expansion Medium growth Recession Ergodic prob.
quantiles Exp Med Rec Exp Med Rec Exp Med Rec Exp Med Rec
1% .96 .04 .00 .28 .57 .15 .00 .00 .99 .19 .03 .78
25% .88 .12 .00 .15 .74 .11 .00 .07 .93 .32 .26 .42
50% .83 .17 .00 .11 .79 .10 .00 .15 .84 .30 .44 .27
75% .73 .27 .00 .08 .84 .08 .00 .40 .60 .20 .67 .13
99% .44 .55 .00 .03 .92 .05 .01 .90 .09 .06 .90 .05
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1407
December 2011
Table 4: Regime-switching model estimates for realized volatility
(including raw disagreement)
A: Estimated parameters
0;s 1;s 2;s 2
s
High 2.252 (0.93) 1.892 (0.04) 0.085 (0.95) 224.893
Medium 9.532 (0.00) 0.448 (0.00) 0.000 (0.99) 8.250
Low 5.800 (0.00) 0.206 (0.00) 0.205 (0.00) 1.760
B: Estimated endogenous transition probabilities and ergodic probabilities
Disagr. High volatility Medium volatility Low volatility Ergodic prob.
quantiles High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low
1% .00 .22 .78 .14 .58 .28 .68 .19 .13 .30 .32 .38
25% .02 .53 .45 .09 .67 .24 .04 .31 .66 .06 .51 .43
50% .07 .69 .23 .07 .72 .21 .00 .19 .81 .04 .44 .52
75% .21 .70 .09 .05 .77 .17 .00 .10 .90 .02 .34 .64
99% .63 .37 .01 .03 .84 .13 .00 .03 .97 .01 .18 .81
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.
Table 5: Regime-switching model estimates for realized volatility
(including ltered disagreement)
A: Estimated parameters
0;s 1;s 2;s 2
s
High 1.641 (0.96) 1.890 (0.06) 0.185 (0.90) 238.024
Medium 9.808 (0.00) 0.441 (0.00) 0.004 (0.92) 9.048
Low 5.788 (0.00) 0.206 (0.00) 0.211 (0.00) 1.845
B: Estimated endogenous transition probabilities and ergodic probabilities
Disagr. High volatility Medium volatility Low volatility Ergodic prob.
quantiles High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low High Med Low
1% .33 .12 .55 .06 .68 .26 .60 .25 .15 .32 .37 .32
25% .23 .38 .39 .06 .69 .25 .02 .34 .64 .05 .53 .42
50% .17 .53 .30 .06 .69 .25 .00 .25 .74 .04 .47 .49
75% .10 .72 .18 .06 .70 .24 .00 .15 .85 .02 .37 .61
99% .01 .96 .03 .06 .71 .23 .00 .03 .97 .01 .13 .86
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.38
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High 3.120 (0.35) -0.576 (0.01) 270.00
Low -0.247 (0.34) 0.036 (0.43) 6.68
B: Estimated endogenous transition probabilities and ergodic probabilities
Disagr. High volatility Low volatility Ergodic prob.
quantiles High Low High Low High Low
1% .32 .68 .37 .63 .35 .65
25% .45 .55 .16 .84 .23 .77
50% .54 .46 .09 .91 .16 .84
75% .63 .37 .04 .96 .10 .90
99% .76 .24 .01 .99 .05 .95
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.





High 3.139 (0.33) -0.570 (0.01) 264.00
Low -0.265 (0.31) 0.035 (0.45) 6.66
B: Estimated endogenous transition probabilities and ergodic probabilities
Disagr. High volatility Low volatility Ergodic prob.
quantiles High Low High Low High Low
1% .75 .25 .26 .74 .52 .48
25% .63 .37 .14 .86 .28 .72
50% .58 .42 .10 .90 .20 .80
75% .50 .50 .07 .93 .12 .88
99% .30 .70 .02 .98 .03 .97
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses.39
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VAR(1) with Zraw -184.08 0.80 0.00
VAR(1) with Zltered -193.19 0.77 0.16
RSAR (R=3) -125.05 0.92 0.00
RSAR (R=3) with Zraw -124.50 0.92 0.00





VAR(2) with Zraw -442.65 0.27 0.76
VAR(2) with Zltered -440.50 0.29 0.09
RSAR (R=3) -355.21 0.81 0.00
RSAR (R=3) with Zraw -360.42 0.80 0.00
RSAR (R=3) with Zltered -355.18 0.81 0.00




VAR(1) with Zraw -452.70 0.14 0.08
VAR(1) with Zltered -451.63 0.15 0.02
RSAR (R=2) -447.04 0.21 0.16
RSAR (R=2) with Zraw -448.08 0.20 0.73
RSAR (R=2) with Zltered -446.86 0.21 0.55
Note: All models are estimated based on the 1978Q1-2010Q3 sample. For the VAR
models, the reported R2 and log likelihood values refer to the rst equation only (i.e. to
GDP or volatility levels/dierences). The p-values refer to likelihood ratio test statistics
that are based on the restricted AR model and respective unrestricted alternative model
schemes, with the number of degrees of freedom for the underlying asymptotic chi-square
distributions of the test statistics being set accordingly.40
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Table 9: Summary statistics for simulated distributions
GDP growth Realized volatility
Agreement Disagreement Agreement Disagreement
Mean 1.06 2.66 17.35 13.94
Median 0.79 2.70 14.56 12.02
STD 3.08 1.24 15.82 7.37
Skewness 0.08 -0.22 11.83 5.90
Kurtosis -0.73 0.88 233.30 60.59
Min -9.19 -3.64 0.15 2.65
Max 9.83 8.95 537.38 141.27
75% Quantile 3.59 3.47 18.55 15.82
25% Quantile -1.28 1.89 11.64 10.21
InterQ-Range 4.87 1.58 6.91 5.61
Note: The statistics are based on a sample of 10,000 periods simu-
lated from the calibrated GDP growth and realized volatility models
presented in Tables 3 and 5, respectively.41
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Figure 1: Disagreement in expectations and macroeconomic aggregates
Note: The disagreement measure is raw (not ltered), and has been normalized so as
to range between [0,1]. For details as to the construction of the disagreement measure
see Section 3.1.44
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Figure 2: Raw vs. ltered disagreement measures based on Michigan Survey
Note: The raw disagreement measure has been normalized so as to range between [0,1].
The ltered disagreement measure is the residual from an auxiliary model that relates
raw disagreement to a set of variables capturing macro and nancial conditions in the
US. For further details see Section 4.45
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Figure 6: Endogenous transition probability estimates - GDP growth model
(including raw disagreement)
Note: Horizontal axes refer to the agreement level (0=agreement, 1=disagreement).
Vertical axes denote the transition probability estimates. Error bounds mark the 10%
and 90% condence levels, respectively.49
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1407
December 2011
Figure 7: Endogenous transition probability estimates - GDP growth model
(including ltered disagreement)
Note: Horizontal axes refer to the agreement level (0=agreement, 1=disagreement).
Vertical axes denote the transition probability estimates. Error bounds mark the 10%
and 90% condence levels, respectively.50
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Figure 8: Endogenous transition probability estimates - Realized volatility model
(including raw disagreement)
Note: Horizontal axes refer to the agreement level (0=agreement, 1=disagreement).
Vertical axes denote the transition probability estimates. Error bounds mark the 10%
and 90% condence levels, respectively.51
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Figure 9: Endogenous transition probability estimates - Realized volatility model
(including ltered disagreement)
Note: Horizontal axes refer to the agreement level (0=agreement, 1=disagreement).
Vertical axes denote the transition probability estimates. Error bounds mark the 10%
and 90% condence levels, respectively.52
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Figure 10: Endogenous transition probability estimates - Model for realized
volatility in rst dierences (including raw disagreement)
Note: Horizontal axes refer to the agreement level (0=agreement, 1=disagreement).
Vertical axes denote the transition probability estimates. Error bounds mark the 10%
and 90% condence levels, respectively.53
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Figure 11: Endogenous transition probability estimates - Model for realized
volatility in rst dierences (including ltered disagreement)
Note: Horizontal axes refer to the agreement level (0=agreement, 1=disagreement).
Vertical axes denote the transition probability estimates. Error bounds mark the 10%
and 90% condence levels, respectively.54
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Figure 12: Path and distribution of simulated GDP growth model
Note: The upper panel shows a sample of 10,000 periods simulated from the GDP
growth regime-switching model presented in Table 3. An Epanechnikov kernel has been
used to obtain a smooth estimate of the probability densities, which are presented in the
lower panel.55
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Figure 13: Path and distribution of simulated realized volatility model
Note: The upper panel shows a sample of 10,000 periods simulated from the realized
volatility regime-switching model presented in Table 5. An Epanechnikov kernel has
been used to obtain a smooth estimate of the probability densities, which are presented
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